Atheism Central for Secondary Schools

The reason for my atheism essentially stems from my experiences when I was about 12 years old. I remember being in a hospital, in a pediatric wing, and seeing very small children suffer in their beds. So, I started to ask questions to people I trusted, and their reactions and replies were extremely shallow and, in a word, rather insulting. I was told more or less to not question, to just accept, but such responses actually ended up having the opposite effect. (Such experiences from atheists are rather common in this regard.)

When it became clear to me that no one had any idea how to answer me in any way that made any sense, I started to get the feeling that I had been lied to all those years, and I became very skeptical of just about everything that was told to me from that point. I kept up appearances for social reasons, but inside my mind the decision was more or less made.

Then I entered philosophy, and my thoughts became more solid and complex when I found so much written on this subject. In short, I found that I was not the only one who had doubts about this, and I felt more confident in my beliefs after I read all the arguments in favor of God's existence and found them to be rather weak. (And Kierkegaard's appeal to the absurd through faith didn't really help matters much; else, why not just go ahead and worship a head of lettuce? -- something TRULY absurd!)

Hume and Nietzsche have been by far some of my most important influences, but the thing that keeps me constant in my belief concerns the people of today, the atheists that I talk to and laugh with. They are a constant reminder of how life can be both moral and meaningful, without an appeal to something transcendent and fictitious. To indulge Nietzsche once again: "We have measured the value of the world according to categories THAT REFER TO A PURELY FICTITIOUS WORLD."[Will to Power, #12] Such a "standard" of comparison can hardly be considered anything but harmful.

Bob Seltzer

"Faith is not WANTING to know what is true."

Nietzsche

"...I am careful not to hold mankind responsible for its mental disorders. But my feeling changes, breaks out, as soon as I enter modern times, OUR time. Our time KNOWS BETTER."

Nietzsche

"If one were to prove this God of the Christians to us, we should be even less able to believe in him."

Nietzsche

Bob Seltzer's web site can be found here
Read his "Divine Command Theory of Morality" and more!

Read the Atheism Central article on Evil here!

PREFACE

What follows is just a rough outline of the Problem of Evil as it is approached in Philosophy. It is not meant to be an exhaustive source on the subject -- just to provide the basics about the Problem. This file is also supposed to have the function of getting the reader to think about (and be bothered by) this issue, and to try and formulate a belief that's justified in answering it.

I. Some Distinctions:

There are some useful distinctions that are usually made when it comes to discussing this problem in Philosophy:

Natural Evil vs. Moral Evil
Natural Evils are those types of evils which occur outside of human control. These are usually seen to be stuff like diseases, earthquakes, tornadoes, and other "chance" occurrences of evil -- i.e., other stuff in the world that we (might) see, such as a deer hit by a car that has to suffer because it's not quite dead yet.

When talking about evils present in the world, it will be helpful to keep this distinction in mind, because some claims might work for only one type of evil and not the other.

Amount of Evil vs. Distribution of Evil
This distinction is important, because even if it could be shown that the amount of evil is okay -- or could be higher -- it could still be the case that the distribution of those evils -- i.e., who ends up shouldering the burdens of those evils -- is still unfair. So, the Problem involves two types of considerations concerning Evils present in the world. Another useful distinction to keep in mind when talking about the Problem.

II. The Problem Stated:

Given these two basic distinctions, The Problem of Evil is usually stated quite simply as the following: Given the fact that God is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good, how can one explain the presence of evils (both natural and moral) in this world (in their amount and distribution)? It is important for the reader at this point to stop reading and think about this Problem. Just reading this file without actually being bothered by the Problem is not the way to do Philosophy.

III. Historical Notes and Fallacies:

The Problem of Evil was actually formulated in its present form in Ancient Greece, from the writings of Epicurus. It was then popularized (although somewhat incorrectly) by David Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and it now has its own place in Philosophy today. (It should also be noted that many theologians have been bothered by this Problem throughout history just as much as anyone else.)

There are some things to keep in mind when talking about this Problem, and some ways of answering it that have been more or less fallacious and/or threatening to theism by theists. Be careful to avoid such avenues of answering this Problem:

"Define 'Evil'"
According to this way of answering the Problem, there is, I suppose, not really a problem of evil at all, because a definition of "evil" cannot be formulated. But before such answers are accepted as clear, it should be noted that there are many words and phrases that we use everyday for which we have no definitions -- yet the meanings of those words are still very clear to us. Just think what it would be like not to be able to come up with a definition of an ordinary, everyday word, and have someone say to you, "Aha! You don't know what you're talking about!" This move to "define your terms" is a weak one at best.

As Wittgenstein says: "When I give you the description: `The ground was quite covered with plants' -- do you want to say I don't know what I'm talking about until I can give a definition of a plant?"

In short, we all have a pretty good idea when bad things happen to good people and when good things happen to bad people -- and, in The Problem of Evil, we are questioning why. These ordinary and clear types of situations are the situations involved with The Problem of Evil.

Moral Evils, on the other hand, are those types of evils which are in the control of humans. These types of evils include rapes, murders, molestation, abuse, and whatever kinds of bad things you can imagine humans doing. Another claim related to this type of view is the following: "Our conception of good, since we are just finite humans, bears little resemblance to the good of God," or "God's conception of good is nothing at all like our conception. But the same objection remains: if what God considers to be "good" has nothing to do with our conception, then why call God "good" at all? This objection rings in a famous quote from John Stuart Mill:

"I will call no being good who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go. If we are going to call God "good," we cannot simply reply, when pressed, that this aspect of God is "beyond our comprehension." For if it's beyond our comprehension, that's the same as saying that we just don't know if God is good -- which, again, brings us to agnosticism.

Don't Question, Just Believe"
This is a very popular response before starting into the Problem of Evil, and it actually has a name. It's called the Appeal to Faith. On the surface, it may seem harmless, and perhaps even comforting, to some person who is confronted with the Problem. But the appeal to faith has many problems, not the least of which concerns its psychological approach to truth. In fact, the appeal to faith can be shown not to be such an appeal at all. In order to see this, consider the following two claims:

(1) I have an undying faith in God.
(2) I have an undying faith that I am the President.

From the point of view of faith, it can be shown that each of these claims is on equal footing. In fact, if we are just talking about faith, then it would be possible to have such an undying faith in just about anything at all. But there seems to be an important different between (1) and (2) -- namely, we would like to claim that (2) is dumb because of the evidence presented to us. That is, right now I'm not in D.C., I'm not surrounded by the Secret Service, I'm not going to international meetings day after day -- i.e., from what I see around me, I'm just not the President. But reasoning in this way is an appeal to evidence -- and this methodology is also assumed by the Problem of Evil, so it seems faith alone cannot do the job of solving it.

Connected with this appeal to faith is the appeal to psychological comfort that comes with a belief in God. But clearly this can't be all there is to the Problem. The question on the table is whether God exists given the evil in the world, not whether believing in God brings comfort. Many people believe lots of things because it gives them comfort -- but it doesn't follow that those things believed are true in any way.

"But it says in the Bible that..."
For these types of replies, it is useful for us to keep in mind what's being questioned. If the existence of God is in question, it seems of little use to try and quote something from what you believe was written or inspired by God. Such a move is called begging the question in Philosophy, and involves a circular way of reasoning.

Now that such responses are mentioned and dismissed, it's time to turn to formal answers to the Problem.

IV. Main Theodicies:

Before starting on theodicies, it's important to understand what a theodicy is. A "theodicy" is simply a defense of God's existence in light of the fact that evils in their present forms and distributions exist. It is a response to the Problem of Evil.

The popular theodicies that I will mention here do not exhaust the issue, but simply provide a background from which one might start discussion on the topic:

A. Evil As Necessary:

These responses to the Problem try to explain that Evil is a necessary part of our world, and that God in some sense had to create the evil along with the world (or some aspect of it). They come in many different forms, which are discussed here.

"Good Cannot Exist Without Evil"
According to this view, good and evil are contradictory terms, and cannot exist without each other. So, if we are to have goods in this world, then there must be evils present as well -- and if the evils are taken away, then the goods will be lost as well. This reply assumes that there is a logical relation between good and evil.

Problems:

The first problem concerning this response is that it's not at all clear that it's true. Good and evil do seem like opposites to some extent at least -- but this claim is a lot stronger: it says that one simply cannot imagine good without evil, because of the tight logical relation between the two concepts. But what are we doing when we are imagining Heaven or Utopia? It seems we are imagining good without evil. If the reply to this is that we cannot imagine Heaven without Hell or something similar, then the claim amounts to saying that even if we can't imagine good without evil, it's still possible to imagine the evil somewhere else. If this is the case, we can rephrase the Problem as: Why is there so much evil here?

The second problem concerns something more basic -- namely, even if good could not exist without evil, this still does not explain its amount and distribution. The fact that children become victims of evils in this world seems hardly enough to justify some corresponding "good" associated with those evils, let alone trying to decide even what those "goods" would be.

"Evil is a Necessary Means to a Good"
According to this response, evil becomes one of those things in the world that ends up giving us goods -- and further, that without such evils, the goods simply would not exist. For an example of this line of reasoning, consider all the humans that died in WW2. The fact that so many people died was indeed evil (i.e., I'm sure we wish that not all those people had to die), but there was clearly a reason why it had to be done (i.e., the overthrow of Hitler). In this sense, then, the deaths are justified -- we do not see them as dying in some senseless way.

Problems:

The basic problem with this answer is that it focuses too much on human potential and not enough on God's potential. God is supposed to be all-powerful, and in this sense, it seems odd to claim that God would "need to do X in order to get Y." If God is all-powerful, then God should just go straight to Y, and bypass some "means" to get to Y. Just think: if humans had the power to overthrow Hitler without causing so many deaths -- wouldn't you just kill Hitler and get on with it? Why go through all that suffering?

The second problem with this answer is that it ignores the amount of evil in the world. With the amount of evil in the world, and with so little good coming from it, this answer does not seem justified.

"Evil Provides Opportunities for Greater Goods"
This response is a popular one, and is primarily a variant of what has been called The Free Will Defense Theodicy. So, it might help to take a look at that.

B. The Free Will Defense (FWD):

This theodicy is probably the most popular around, because it focuses on the responsibility of humans, which is clearly marked in our morality. Among other things, it claims the following: that freely choosing to do good is the highest good (i.e., not being programmed to do so), that if we are free we must be able to choose otherwise (i.e., choosing the bad stuff), and that, since God couldn't make us so that we would do the right thing all the time (because then we'd be robots), we are left with being free and being able to choose the wrong thing. The evil in the world, then, is the product of human choices, and is the fault of humans.

Problems:

The first thing to note about the FWD concerns a distinction we made at the start of this file: Natural Evils vs. Moral Evils. In order for the FWD to answer the Problem of Evil adequately, it must address both kinds of evils in the world. That is, it must answer both the problem of natural evil as well as moral evil. So, let's take a look at each one in turn.

FWD and Natural Evil
This is where the FWD is weakest. That is, it seems by ordinary standards that humans have little control of the natural stuff that goes on in the world. One might argue that with today's problems of CO2 and the ozone layer we have created (or will create) such problems. It might even be the case that stuff like AIDS and cancer are connected to our actions in some indirect way (i.e., maybe there's a cure for it somewhere but we're holding it back because cancer research makes so much money for the companies who sponsor it). But these replies lose their strength rapidly, because we can always just "turn back the clock" to a time when the relevant technology just wasn't present. In such a time, the evils were still there, and so the problem remains.

Aside from this reply, one might think that we are looking to do away with physical laws altogether, and that maybe we are looking for a world with no physical laws (maybe some freeform floating world). With this, it might be said that physical laws are necessary for a predictable world, and that such a world would be impossible without them. In some sense, we should be happy that our world is predictable, because if it wasn't, then things would be really bad. But the question still remains why so much of our world is hidden when it comes to physical laws -- i.e., stuff like cancer, AIDS, and other types of brain diseases that slowly breakdown a person's integrity and well-being. Wouldn't it be easier to keep the laws where they are and just let us know how to stop the suffering that comes along with them?

A final consideration for this reply is the following. Suppose we were to claim that there is an important relation between the natural disasters and Free Will -- namely, that natural disasters are necessary to give the opportunity for noble acts. In this sense, diseases are around because that would entail people trying to find a cure for them -- a very noble thing for a person to do. Just take a look at any disaster in the media today: floods, tornadoes, hurricanes -- all of these things bring people together to help other people in times of need.

But there are problems in taking this view as an answer to The Problem of Evil. The first is that it doesn't help to answer those kinds of situations where we can't fix things like diseases. For those types of situations, the frustration involved in not being able to fix what's wrong can backfire and cause someone to abandon a life's work. But even if someone were to say that the effort to save people is enough in itself, there is still another, more basic, problem with this view: the problem of how evils are distributed. That is, if the only reason given why natural disasters occur is to prompt someone to help someone else, then it's clear that the people who get the bad stuff in the world are being used by God as a means to prompt others to come to their aid. When one just considers how much bad stuff kids get, this hardly seems like an adequate justification for natural disasters.

Just consider this example. According to the World Health Organization in the 80's, the disease called smallpox has been essentially wiped off the planet. We probably have some specimens in jars for reference -- but for the most part, dying from smallpox doesn't happen anymore. Further, the reason why it doesn't happen is due to the massive vaccinations given around the world. Now, the question: Why was smallpox around? When it was around, you had less than a 50/50 chance of surviving the disease, and it was a slow, painful death. It also, like any virus, did not discriminate -- i.e., it killed kids right along with everyone else. Wiping it off the planet didn't alter the ecosystem or destroy the planet, and millions of living organisms still survive in light of the fact that smallpox is gone -- so it wasn't as if smallpox played an important ecological role or anything.

So, why was it around? If the answer is "to prompt us to help others," we have the problem of using people; if the answer is "it needed to be there physically," the evidence shows this false; if the answer is "because suffering is necessary to be a good person," then it seems clear that we should not have tried to eradicate it in the first place. Something to think about...

With the problems of the FWD and natural evils discussed, let's now turn the other kinds of evils in the world -- moral evils.

FWD and Moral Evils
It might seem that the FWD is strongest in this area. That is, if moral evils are those types of things like rapes and murders, and if those things are clearly related to how we, as humans, act in the world, then it must be that these types of evils in the world are our fault, and not the fault of God. But there are other things to consider. The first thing to think about is the kind of freedom we have. That is, do we really need this much (or kind) of freedom? Do we need the kind of freedom that involves killing six million Jews (during the Holocaust), or twelve million Russians (during the Stalin Killing Years), or seven million women (during the 300-year Witch Hunts throughout Europe)? It seems that the possibility is clearly open for making humanity more compassionate (and intelligent) instead of so callous -- so why not make us that way?

To these questions, there exists a popular answer, which is this: God could not have made us in any other way, because "being free" does not admit of degrees. That is, either you're free or you're not, and when you are, that entails the possibility that you can use your freedom to do the wrong thing -- which means that it entails the possibility of all those killings.

Again, this is a very popular answer, and one that might appeal to us intuitively at first, playing on our common sense. But there are problems with it -- and it also happens to bring up some very interesting questions about freedom.

The first thing to think about when it comes to "being free" is this: is it an all-or-nothing concept? Is "being free" like "being pregnant"? Clearly, there are cases where we say that a person is not as free as another. People in jail are not as free as I am at this moment, people who have disorders that concern them washing their hands every twenty minutes are not as free as those who don't, and so on. So, at least from a rough pass, we can say that freedom can, in fact, admit of degrees.

But this claim is not enough to rebut the reply of freedom. What needs to be shown is that it's possible for God to make humans another way and for us still to be free. Can one show this?

I think it might be helpful to consider the following situation. Just suppose that, instead of making us like we are, God chooses to make humans such that they always do the right thing. In this situation, would we be free? At first glance, you might think "clearly not" -- but if we're not free in this situation, this amounts to claiming that in order to be free it's necessary that we do the wrong thing once in a while, which doesn't seem like a plausible thing to claim. To see this, consider yourself in such a situation: Is it true that you have to do the wrong thing now and again just to be sure of your freedom?

Another example comes from raising children and teaching them to be moral agents. When we see our children doing the wrong thing, we try to influence their behavior in order for them to stop doing it and start behaving the right way. Such actions are clearly a part of everyday parental responsibilities. Now, when as a parent you teach your child to do the right thing, are you taking away their freedom? Further, would it be necessary for you to see your child do something wrong, just to be sure that the child was free? It would seem odd for a parent to stand at a playground with a child, watch the child hit another one, and look upon such a situation as positive -- the reason being that such actions reaffirm the fact that the child was indeed free! It seems that always doing the right thing and being free are not exclusive of one another.

But there is another problem with the FWD when it comes to moral evils, aside from this discussion of freedom. In order to understand this, consider the following situation. I am walking along a street, and I happen to pass an alley. In this alley, I see a 12-year old beating a 6-year old with a stick. I keep walking along the street, and I sigh and say to myself: "Hey, that 12-year old is free, there's nothing else I can do..." What's wrong with this situation? It seems clear that, even if we grant that freedom exists, and that humans have the freedom to choose to do the wrong thing, it seems for some situations, standing by and not doing anything is irresponsible. I should have stopped that beating as soon as I saw it happening. There was little (if any) danger to me in stopping it, and it was just wrong to walk away from it. Now, with this reasoning in mind, consider situations like the Holocaust, the Stalin Killing Years, and the Witch Hunts. Is standing by while millions of people are being killed a responsible thing to do? Further, think again of the distribution of such evils -- i.e., the fact that good people and kids were also tortured and killed.

So, even where the FWD seems strongest, with moral evils, it seems clear that by itself it just is not enough to answer the Problem.

Even though the above theodicies are the main ones, there are other theodicies as well that deserve some mention. Some of these secondary theodicies are important for understanding our basic concepts of right and wrong -- but others seem to be attempts at quick solutions to The Problem (and both need to be discussed).

IV. Other Theodicies:

"Evil is a Means for Punishing Sins" &
"Evil is a Means for God to Remind You of His Power"
The main problem with these reply is that there seem to be much better ways to do this -- and, again, we are back to the problem of distribution. That is, the fact that this answer does little to justify the bad stuff that happens to kids in the world.

"Evil is Justified because of The Fall"
This reply claims that because Adam and Eve sinned against God in the Garden of Eden that the evils in the world -- both natural and moral -- are justified, even with its distribution. But it's not exactly clear how just one act by two people so long ago is supposed to justify both the amount and distribution of natural and moral evil for everyone else that came after them. It seems extremely difficult to justify the fairness of such a consequence

"Evil is Justified through an Appeal to the Afterlife"
This reply seems to be claiming that, because things will be made-up to us later, the present amount and distribution of evils is justified. But clearly there are problems with this view. In order to see how, consider the following situation. I am torturing someone for about eight hours straight, and then I say to this person, "Hey, relax -- in about two hours, you'll be drowned in luxury, and have all the food and drink you want." In such a case, what seems to be morally in question is not what comes after the torture, but why I was torturing this person in the first place. The same objection can be said for this reply.

"Evil is a Way of Testing Faith in God"
This is a popular response to The Problem of Evil, and also brings to light some aspects of our morality that are important in answering this. The basic problem with this reply is the notion of testing, and how testing is related to two issues:

(1) God's property of being all-knowing, and
(2) the moral requirement of consent.

For the first, it seems clear that testing with a being who is all-knowing leaves little to the imagination. That is, if I knew with certainty what my students would get before handing out an exam, then actually testing those students seems like going through the motions, with no real significance.

But even if God didn't know how we would perform on a test, the second consideration becomes important. In order to see how, consider first the following situation. I am walking along, and then out of the bushes Ivander Holyfield jumps out and starts beating me up. When he's done, he throws a check on my lap in the amount of a million dollars. Now consider this situation in contrast to the previous one: I am walking along, and then Holyfield jumps out of the bushes -- but instead of pounding me, he says, "Look, I'll give you a million dollars if you can last five minutes fighting me." What is the difference between the two situations? In one, I get pounded, but I get a check -- in the other I have the choice of whether or not to get pounded. It seems clear that just pounding me out of the blue without my consent is morally reprehensible, to say the least.

Finally, there is the simple fact that not all people who end up being "tested" by God actually live through the "test" given. When we see people die, what are we supposed to say about that? That they "failed the test"?

V. Conclusions and Other "God"s:

What I have tried to do is to sketch out the traditional objections and replies to the Problem of Evil. This is in no way to consider the Problem closed to discussion, but only to look at the possibilities of explanation for what we see around us.

In response to the Problem, some claim that a Judeo-Christian conception of God is not accurate, and "God" is really something else -- like energy or order. But there are, I guess, two main things to consider when confronted with these characterizations of "God."

First, ask yourself why these characterizations are put forth in the first place -- i.e., why isn't the Judeo-Christian conception of God accurate? -- and, second, just consider the characterization of "God" that people end up with -- i.e., could it really be "God"? Is it a personal being? Does it care about us?

And consider the other aspects of God -- i.e., all-powerful and all-knowing. If someone wants to knock down these aspects, then extreme care should be taken to explain why such a being is "God." When we end up limiting "God" and claim that God is not an all-powerful being, care should be taken to avoid any trivial connection between this "being" and sci-fi characters. Does this "being" warrant worship in a religious sense?

But, in any case, regardless of how you answer this Problem, it should be noted that the effort in trying to answer it is very important -- because the Problem of Evil is something that SHOULD BOTHER YOU. If, after reading this file, you're not really bothered by the amount and distribution of evil that goes on in the world everyday while keeping in mind what God is supposed to be like, then I'm surprised you had the time, or cared enough, to read all this. But whatever the case may be, if you're not bothered by the existence of both God and evil in the world, you might want to reconsider your moral conscience for humanity...